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PARTNERS IN CRIME: THE JOINT PARTICIPANTS
EXCEPTION TO THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
ADVERSE SPOUSAL TESTIMONY
INTRODUCTION
The privilege against adverse spousal testimony is the privilege of a
witness in federal' proceedings2 to refuse to testify against his or her
spouse.3 The rationale behind the privilege is that the harmony and
1. This Note will address only federal privilege law, which is governed by the federal
courts. See Fed. R. Evid. 501; see also McCormick On Evidence § 76.1, at 182-83 (E.
Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (discussing application of Rule 501 by federal courts) [hereinafter
cited as McCormick On Evidence]; 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 401,
402, at 407-12 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing the predecessor to Rule 501-Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1946-1975)). For an example of the regulation of
federal privilege law by federal courts, see infra notes 15-32 and accompanying text.
State privilege law is diverse, McCormick On Evidence, supra, § 76.2, at 183, each state
having its own rules regarding the applicability of privileges in the courts, see id. § 75, at
181-82; 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 488, at 657-96 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979). State law
with respect to the privilege against adverse spousal testimony is no exception to this
general proposition. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 n.9 (1980); Case
Comment, Evidence-The Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony Extended to In-
clude Indirect Implications, 13 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 123, 125-26 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Indirect Implications]; Note, Evidentiary Privilege: Privilege of Defendant to Prevent
Adverse Spousal Testimony Abolished-Trammel v. United States 100 S. Ct 906 (1980),
6 U. Dayton L. Rev. 147, 149-50 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Evidentiary Privilege].
2. The privilege applies at federal grand jury proceedings as well as at trial. In re
Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 277 (3d Cir. 1980); In re Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir.
1974); In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev. 1983); see United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974); In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2258-59, 2264 (2d
Cir. Feb. 28, 1985); Fed. R. Evid. 1 101(d)(2); Fed. R. Evid. 501; Indirect Implications,
supra note 1, at 129.
3. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980); In re Koecher, No. 85-1033,
slip op. at 2264-65 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985); United States v. Archer, 733 F.2d 354, 358
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 196 and 105 S. Ct. 198 (1984); United States v. Ammar,
714 F.2d 238, 258 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 344-45 (1983); United States v. Clark,
712 F.2d 299, 300 (7th Cir. 1983); In re United States, 673 F.2d 688, 691-92 (3d Cir.),
cert denied, 459 U.S. 1015 (1982); In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 277 (3d Cir. 1980);
Note, Federal Criminal Procedure-Privilege for Adverse Spousal Testimony Vested in
Witness Spouse-Trammel v. United States, 3 Campbell L. Rev. 125, 125 (1981) [herein-
after cited as Criminal Procedure]; Note, Modification of the Privilege Against Adverse
Spousal Testimony: Trammel v. United States, 34 Sw. L.J. 1013, 1014 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Modification]; Note, Evidence-Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony-In
a Federal Criminal Proceeding Choice of Whether to Testify Against a Defendant Spouse
Belongs to Witness Spouse Alone, 55 Tul. L. Rev. 961, 962 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Choice to Testify].
The privilege not to reveal confidential marital communications is a distinct privilege.
See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 45 n.5; In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2264; United
States v. Sims, No. 82-1523, slip op. at 3-4 (6th Cir. Feb. 28, 1985); Archer, 733 F.2d at
359; Ammar, 714 F.2d at 258; United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1379 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978); United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 189 (8th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Bolzer, 556 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977) and 434 U.S. 1045 (1978); United States v. Ter-
mini, 267 F.2d 18, 19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 822 (1959); McCormick On Evi-
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sanctity of a marriage should be fostered as a matter of social policy and
that therefore the government should.not compel spouses to alienate one
another through adverse testimony.4 Rooted in English common
dence, supra note 1, § 66; 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2334, at 646 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961); 2 C. Wright, supra note 1, § 406, at 437-38; Choice to Testify, supra, at 962-63
n.10; 13 U. West L.A. L. Rev. 159, 161 (1981). It protects communications between
spouses made in confidence and intended to be confidential. See Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1951); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1934); United
States v. Termini, 267 F.2d 18, 19-20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 822 (1959); McCor-
mick On Evidence, supra note 1, § 80, at 193; 8 J. Wigmore, supra, § 2336, at 648; 2 C.
Wright, supra note 1, § 406, at 438; Comment, Adverse Spousal Testimony in Maryland
and the Fourth Circuit, 10 U. Balt. L. Rev. 338, 343 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Fourth
Circuit]; 13 U. West L.A. L. Rev. 159, 161-62 (1981).
In contrast to the privilege not to reveal confidential marital communications, the priv-
ilege against adverse spousal testimony protects from disclosure any adverse evidence,
whether or not the testifying spouse's knowledge was gained through marital communi-
cations intended to be kept confidential. 8 J. Wigmore, supra, § 2333, at 644; see Haney,
Spousal Testimonial Privileges in Federal Criminal Trials: Constricting the Growth of
Marital Privileges by Interpretation in the "Light of Reason and Experience" 8 Am. J.
Crim. L. 231, 261-62 (1980); Choice to Testify, supra, at 962 n.10; 19 J. Fam. L. 171, 173-
74 (1980-81). The privilege therefore excludes adverse evidence of acts observed and of
communications made in the presence of third persons. See Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Choice to Testify, supra, at 971; Comment, Adverse Spousal Testi-
mony: A New Rule for the Federal Courts, 32 U. Fla. L. Rev. 784, 784-85 & n.4 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as A New Rule]; 11 Cum. L. Rev. 465, 471 (1980); 19 J. Fam. L. 171,
173-74 (1980-81).
4. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); Wyatt v. United States, 362
U.S. 525, 527 (1960); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958); Lutwak v. United
States, 344 U.S. 604, 615 (1953); In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2269 (2d Cir.
Feb. 28, 1985); In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 277 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Tsin-
nijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980); United
States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 1978), affid on other grounds, 445 U.S.
40 (1980); Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 543 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 820 (1978); United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting
Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958)); United States v. Van Drunen, 501
F.2d 1393, 1396 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974); United States v. Termini,
267 F.2d 18, 19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 822 (1959); United States v. Geller, 560
F. Supp. 1309, 1325 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd mem. sub nom. United States v. DeMaise, 745
F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1984); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2228, at 216; 2 C. Wright, supra
note 1, § 405, at 435-36; Haney, supra note 3, at 233, 249; Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and
Prerogatives: A Critical Examination of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence As They
Affect Marital Privilege, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1353, 1363 (1973); Criminal Procedure, supra
note 3, at 125; Modification, supra note 3, at 1016, 1020; Choice to Testify, supra note 3, at
967; Fourth Circuit, supra note 3, at 340, 344; Case Comment, Witness-Spouse Alone May
Exercise Spousal Testimonial Privilege in Federal Criminal Cases, 59 Wash. U.L.Q. 560,
566 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Witness-Spouse]; 58 Den. L.J. 357, 365 (1981); 69 I11. B.J.
438, 438 (1981); 19 J. Fam. L. 171, 174-75 (1980-81).
A second rationale for the privilege-avoiding the repugnance society naturally feels
when one spouse is convicted through the compelled testimony of another-has been
advanced, see, e.g., In re Koecher, No. 84-1428, slip op. at 2270 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985)
(quoting 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2228, at 217); Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d
531, 543 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); United States v. Gonella, 103
F.2d 123, 123 (3d Cir. 1939), but it is largely outdated, see Haney, supra note 3, at 234;
Modification, supra note 3, at 1016, 1020; Choice to Testify, supra note 3, at 962, 967;
Fourth Circuit, supra note 3, at 340, 344; A New Rule, supra note 3, at 785-87; 58 Den.
L.J. 357, 365 (1981). But see In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2270 (2d Cir. Feb.
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law,' the privilege focuses on preserving the marital harmony existing at
the time of the proceeding at which the witness is called to testify.6 A
refusal to testify against a spouse presumably indicates that there is mari-
tal harmony to preserve.7 On the other hand, willingness to testify
against a spouse evidences a lack of such harmony.8
In 1983 the Seventh Circuit held that the privilege cannot be claimed
by a witness who is alleged to have participated in the crime with which
his or her spouse is charged and about which the witness is summoned to
testify.9 Under these circumstances, the witness may be compelled to
28, 1985) (quoting 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2228, at 217) (court cites repugnance
rationale as one of the reasons for the privilege); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2228, at
217 (author argues that repugnance rationale is most plausible reason for the privilege).
5. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1980); Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 221 (1839); United
States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d 836, 839 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); Bent v.
Allot, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1579-80); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2227, at 211;
Reutlinger, supra note 4, at 1363; Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 127; Modification,
supra note 3, at 1014-15; Choice to Testify, supra note 3, at 962; Fourth Circuit, supra note
3, at 338-42; A New Rule, supra note 3, at 785-86; 58 Den. LJ. 357, 358 (1981).
6. United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 258 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 344-
45 (1983); see In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2269 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985);
United States v. Archer, 733 F.2d 354, 359-60 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 196 and
105 S. Ct. 198 (1984); In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 279 n.5 (3d Cir. 1980); Fourth
Circuit, supra note 3, at 344; cf. Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 543, 545 (7th Cir.
1977) (privilege not available to spouses who, at the time of trial, had been married 40
years and did not contend that the privilege was needed to protect their marriage), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977)
(privilege not available to spouses whose marriage at the time of trial had in fact,
although not legally, terminated); United States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir.)
(privilege not available to spouse who had testified at divorce proceedings that a reconcili-
ation was impossible), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); United States v. Termini, 267
F.2d 18, 19-20 (2d Cir.) (privilege not available after divorce because there is no marriage
to preserve), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 822 (1959). But cf. Jackson v. United States, 250 F.2d
897, 899-900 (5th Cir. 1958) (privilege applied when spouses had been separated for a
number of years).
7. See Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 534 (1960) (Warren, CJ., dissenting);
69 IlM. B.J. 438, 440 (1981); cf. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (volun-
tary adverse testimony deemed to be evidence of a lack of marital harmony).
8. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980); McCormick On Evidence,
supra note 1, § 66, at 162; 19 J. Fam. L. 171, 174 (1980-81). But see Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74, 77-78 (1958) (voluntary adverse testimony considered to be evidence
of momentary flare-up rather than a complete lack of marital harmony); Haney, supra
note 3, at 275-76 (voluntary testimony in case of alleged joint participant spouse may
indicate no more than a desire to save himself or herself from a threatened future convic-
tion); Modification, supra note 3, at 1021-22 & n.73 (same); Choice to Testify, supra note
3, at 969 (same); Comment, Marital Privileges and the Right To Testify, 34 U. Chi. L
Rev. 196, 204 (1966) (same) [hereinafter cited as Marital Privileges]; Witness-Spouse,
supra note 4, at 569 (same); 58 Den. L.J. 357, 368 (1981) (same).
9. United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 300-01 (7th Cir. 1983) (alternative holding).
Although prior to 1983 the Seventh and Tenth Circuits had adopted the same exception,
see United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1169 (10th Cir. 1978), afd on other
grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396-97 (7th
Cir.) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974), the exception was to the
privilege as it existed at that time, when the witness could not adversely testify over the
objection of his or her spouse, see Trammel, 583 F.2d at 1167; Van Drunen, 501 F.2d at
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testify against his or her spouse.' ° The Second1 and Third 2 Circuits
have rejected this exception to the privilege.
This Note examines the appropriateness of the joint participants ex-
ception to the privilege against adverse spousal testimony. Part I briefly
traces the history of the privilege and demonstrates that the courts are
free to create exceptions to the privilege when policy considerations so
warrant. Part II analyzes the rationales upon which the joint partici-
pants exception is based and argues that in light of the purpose of the
privilege and the recent Supreme Court modification of the privilege in
Trammel v. United States, 3 the exception is not justified. Part III dem-
onstrates the undesirable practical effects of adoption of the exception
and concludes that the courts should not recognize the joint participants
exception to the privilege against adverse spousal testimony.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE
The privilege against adverse spousal testimony evolved from an Eng-
lish common law rule 4 that disqualified spouses from testifying for or
against each other." The rule was based on public policy favoring the
1396. Since that time, the privilege has been modified, see infra note 31 and accompany-
ing text. It is the joint participants exception to the modified privilege that is examined in
this Note.
10. See In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2265 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985); In re
Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 277 (3d Cir. 1980); cf. United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 300
(7th Cir. 1983) (court affirmed contempt order issued by district court when spouse re-
fused to testify after exception was applied).
11. See In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2264 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985).
12. See In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278-79 (3d Cir. 1980).
13. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
14. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
15. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1980); Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 613 (1953); Stein v.
Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 221 (1839); In re United States, 673 F.2d 688, 697 (3d
Cir. 1982) (Adams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1015 (1982); United States v.
Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977) and 434 U.S. 1045
(1978); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1365 (8th Cir. 1975); Jackson v. United
States, 250 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1958); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2227, at 212
(quoting 1 E. Coke, A Commentarie Upon Littleton 6b (1628)); Haney, supra note 3, at
232; Choice to Testify, supra note 3, at 962; 58 Den. L.J. 357, 358 (1981); 13 U. West L.A.
L. Rev. 159, 162 (1981).
The rule of disqualification had developed by 1628, see 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3,
§ 2227, at 212; Modification, supra note 3, at 1014 & n.9, however, prior to that time both
favorable and adverse spousal testimony were appareptly admissible. See Bent v. Allot,
21 Eng. Rep. 50, (Ch. 1579-80) (wife permitted to testify in behalf of her husband; hus-
band permitted to exclude her adverse testimony on cross-examination by suppressing the
favorable testimony given on direct examination).
There was an exception to the rule in criminal prosecutions in which one spouse was
accused of committing an offense against the person of the other. See Trammel, 445 U.S.
at 46 n.7; Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 75; Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 221; United States v.
Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 1978), affid on other grounds, 445 U.S. 40
(1980); Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 127; Choice to Testify, supra note 3, at 963;
Fourth Circuit, supra note 3, at 340. In such a case adverse spousal testimony was admis-
sible. See Reutlinger, supra note 4 at 1363; Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 127.
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fostering of family peace,16 repugnance to the conviction of an individual
through the testimony of his or her spouse, 7 and a desire to rid the
courts of perjured testimony likely to be given by witnesses interested in
the case.' I
Prior to the enactment of legislation governing the applicability of
common law privileges in federal proceedings, United States federal
courts assumed that all such privileges applied 9 and, in the absence of
legislation, could be modified as the courts saw fit.' Under this assump-
tion the Supreme Court abolished the portion of the rule excluding testi-
mony by one spouse in favor of the other,2" reasoning that the rationale
behind it-witness incompetency because of interest-was outdated and
therefore no longer supported the rule's application.' The remainder of
the rule was treated as a privilege barring adverse testimony in the ab-
sence of the consent of both spouses.23 Subsequently, Congress provided
16. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958); Lutwak v. United States, 344
U.S. 604, 615 (1953); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 222 (1839); Reutlinger,
supra note 4, at 1363; Fourth Circuit, supra note 3, at 340; A New Rule, supra note 3, at
786 & n.17; 58 Den L.J. 357, 359 (1981); 69 Ill. B.J. 438, 438 (1981); see In re United
States, 673 F.2d 688, 697 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1015
(1982); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2227, at 212 (quoting 1 E. Coke, A Commentarie
Upon Littleton 6b (1628)).
17. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 535 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting);
United States v. Gonella, 103 F.2d 123, 123 (3d Cir. 1939); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3,
§ 2227, at 212; Choice to Testify, supra note 3, at 962; A New Rule, supra note 3, at 785-
86; see Fourth Circuit, supra note 3, at 340.
18. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958); see Reutlinger, supra note 4, at
1363; Modification, supra note 3, at 1014; Fourth Circuit, supra note 3, at 339-40; Eviden-
tiary Privilege, supra note 1, at 147; A New Rule, supra note 3, at 786 & n.14; 58 Den.
L.J. 357, 358 (1981); see also Scott v. Lloyd, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 145, 149 (1838) (persons
interested in a case will be tempted to perjure themselves).
Apparently, the portion of the rule excluding favorable testimony was based on witness
incompetency because of interest, 69 IMI. B.J. 438, 438 (1981); see Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74, 76 (1958) (once the interest rationale was no longer deemed viable,
the portion of the rule barring favorable spousal testimony was abolished); Haney, supra
note 3, at 232-33 (same); Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 127-28 (same); Modifica-
tion, supra note 3, at 1014-15 (same); Evidentiary Privilege, supra note 1, at 147-48
(same), while the portion excluding adverse testimony was based on the desires to foster
marital harmony and avoid society's repugnance to convicting an individual through his
or her spouse's testimony. See In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2270 (2d Cir. Feb.
28, 1985); Reutlinger, supra note 4, at 1359-60, 1363.
19. See, eg., Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12-13 (1934); Funk v. United States,
290 U.S. 371, 379 (1933); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 221 (1839).
20. See Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934); Funk v. United States, 290
U.S. 371, 381-83 (1933). Courts reasoned that the application of privileges in federal
proceedings was "governed by common law principles as interpreted and applied by the
federal courts in the light of reason and experience." Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7,
12 (1934) (citing Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933)).
21. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 386 (1933). In fact, a defendant in a crimi-
nal case has a constitutional right to have his or her spouse testify in his or her favor. See
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967).
22. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 380-82 (1933).
23. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); Hawkins v. United States, 358
U.S. 74, 78 (1958); see Modification, supra note 3, at 1015; Choice to Testify, supra note 3,
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that common law privileges, as modified by the federal courts, would
apply in all federal criminal proceedings and in federal civil proceedings
whenever federal law supplied the rule of decision with respect to a par-
ticular claim or defense.24
Courts have adopted numerous exceptions to the privilege against ad-
verse spousal testimony. For example, the privilege does not apply when
a spouse is charged with a crime against the person of the witness,2" nor
does it apply when the marriage is a "sham ' 26 or has terminated through
divorce.27 In adopting these and other exceptions, 28 the courts reasoned
at 963; Evidentiary Privilege, supra note 1, at 148; A New Rule, supra note 3, at 788; 13 U.
West L.A. L. Rev. 159, 163-64 (1981).
24. See Fed. R. Evid. 501. In 1946, Congress enacted Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provided in pertinent part:
The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses
shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise pro-
vide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 26, 327 U.S. 827, 852 (1946). Thus, Rule 26 affirmatively granted
federal courts conducting criminal proceedings the power they had previously assumed.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 26 advisory committee note, reprinted in 2 C. Wright, supra note I,
§ 401, at 408 n.2 (2d ed. 1982).
When Rule 26 was amended in 1972 (effective July 1, 1975), the above quoted language
was deleted because the Federal Rules of Evidence were to govern the privileges of wit-
nesses. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 26 advisory committee note. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence provides in pertinent part:
[T]he privilege of a witness. . . shall be governed by the principles of the com-
mon law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the
rule of decision, the privilege of a witness. . . shall be determined in accord-
ance with State law.
Fed. R. Evid. 501.
25. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 46 n.7 (1980); Wyatt v. United States,
362 U.S. 525, 526 (1960); id. at 532 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Hawkins v. United States,
358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 221 (1839); United States
v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1169 (10th Cir. 1978), aft'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 40
(1980); United States v. Smith, 533 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); 8 J.
Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2239, at 242-43. The scope of the exception was expanded to
include the situation in which a spouse is charged with a crime affecting the witness's
property, see Herman v. United States, 220 F.2d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 971 (1956), and the situation in which a spouse is charged with a crime against
his own or the witness's child, see United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1367 (8th Cir.
1975).
26. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 606-07, 614-15 (1953) (privilege inapplica-
ble when spouses married for sole purpose of gaining entry into the United States under
the War Brides Act); see United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 570-71 (10th Cir. 1975)
(privilege inapplicable when spouses married apparently for the sole purpose of obtaining
benefit of privilege).
27. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954); United States v. Bolzer, 556 F.2d
948, 951 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977) and 434 U.S. 1045 (1978); United States v. Crockett, 534
F.2d 589, 604 n.17 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Smith, 533 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir.
1976) (per curiam); United States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d 836, 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1033 (1975); United States v. Termini, 267 F.2d 18, 19-20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
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that under the circumstances, the purpose of the privilege-fostering
marital harmony-would not be served by its application.29 In addition,
the Supreme Court, in 1980, using similar reasoning,3" modified the privi-
lege by vesting the right to claim it solely in the witness.31 When a wit-
ness, rather than claiming the privilege, chooses to testify against his or
her spouse, presumably there is no marital harmony to foster.32 Thus,
applying the privilege would serve no purpose.33
It is well settled, therefore, that federal courts have power to define the
scope of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony and to create
exceptions to its application in federal proceedings when, under the cir-
U.S. 822 (1959); United States v. Gonella, 103 F.2d 123, 123-24 (3d Cir. 1939); 8 J.
Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2237, at 240; 2 C. Wright, supra note I, § 405, at 435-36.
28. The privilege does not apply when the adverse testimony concerns matters that
took place prior to marriage, United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1983)
(alternative holding); United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir.) (alter-
native holding), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974), when the marriage of the spouses is
not recognized by any state, see United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 74748 (9th Cir.),
cerL denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977) and 434 U.S. 1045 (1978); United States v. White, 545
F.2d 1129, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), or when the marriage has in fact, although
not legally, terminated, see United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977).
But see Jackson v. United States, 250 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1958) (defendant who had
been separated from witness-spouse for a number of years permitted to invoke privilege).
The privilege is inapplicable when the marriage is so stable that it is not necessary to
protect marital harmony. See Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 543 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978). The privilege also does not apply when adverse spousal
statements are admitted through the testimony of third persons, see United States v.
Archer, 733 F.2d 354, 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 196 and 105 S. Ct. 198
(1984); United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 966 (1980); United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219, 225 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968), or through tape recordings when spouses were joint partici-
pants in a conspiracy, see United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1068 (1979).
29. See Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 527 (1960) (crime against witness-
spouse); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 615 (1953) ("sham" marriage); United
States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1169 (10th Cir. 1978) (crime against witness-spouse),
affid on other grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 543 (7th
Cir. 1977) (marriage so stable privilege not necessary), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978);
United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977) (marriage in fact termi-
nated); United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219, 225 (2d Cir.) (third party testified to
adverse spousal statements), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968); United States v. Termini,
267 F.2d 18, 19-20 (2d Cir.) (marriage terminated by divorce), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 822
(1959). But see United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1983) (in considering
exception for acts prior to marriage, court ignored question whether marital harmony
might be preserved by applying privilege); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 74748
(9th Cir.) Cm adopting exception for marriages not recognized by the state, court did not
address preservation of marital harmony), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977) and 434 U.S.
1045 (1978); United States v. White, 545 F.2d 1129, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam)
(same); United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir.) (in adopting excep-
tion for acts prior to marriage, court did not consider whether marital harmony might be
preserved by applying privilege), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974).
30. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980).
31. See id. at 53.
32. See supra note 8.
33. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980).
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cumstances, the underlying purpose of the privilege will not be served by
its application.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
There are three34 proposed justifications for the joint participants ex-
ception to the privilege against adverse spousal testimony: 5 married per-
34. A fourth proposed justification is that the goal of the privilege does not justify
assuring a criminal that he or she can enlist the aid of his or her spouse in a criminal
venture without fear of creating another potential adverse witness. See United States v.
Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1169-
70 (10th Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974)), affid on other grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980);
United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091
(1974). This rationale is similar to Jeremy Bentham's criticism of the privilege:
Let us, therefore, grant to every man a license to commit all sorts of wickedness,
in the presence and with the assistance of his wife: let us secure to every man in
the bosom of his family, and in his own bosom, a safe accomplice: let us make
every man's house his castle; and, as far as depends upon us, let us convert that
castle into a den of thieves.
5 J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, 340 (1827). Because the modification of
the privilege in Trammel eliminated any right of the defendant to exclude his or her
spouse's adverse testimony, see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980), neither
Bentham's general criticism of the privilege nor the similar justification for the joint par-
ticipants exception is viable. See In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2266-67 (2d Cir.
Feb. 28, 1985) (justification for exception no longer viable); cf Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 51-52 (1980) (in deciding to deprive defendant-spouse of privilege, Court
considered Bentham's criticism). After Trammel, reliance on such arguments either to
criticize the privilege or to justify exceptions to it is misplaced.
35. A joint participants exception to the privilege not to reveal confidential marital
communications has been adopted by five circuits. See United States v. Sims, No. 82-
1523, slip op. at 8 (6th Cir. Feb. 28, 1985); United States v. Broome, 732 F.2d 363, 365
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 181 (1984); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 258
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 344 (1983); United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373,
1381 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978); United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191,
194-95 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973) (on marital privilege issue), rev'd
on other grounds, 415 U.S. 143 (1974). The two marital privileges are, however, distinct,
see supra note 3, and should be considered separately in determining whether a particular
exception should be adopted. See In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2268-69 (2d
Cir. Feb. 28, 1985); United States v. Archer, 733 F.2d 354, 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 196 and 105 S. Ct. 198 (1984); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 258 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 344 (1983); see also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6
(1954) (privilege against adverse spousal testimony, unlike marital communications privi-
lege, does not apply after divorce); United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir.
1978) (same); United States v. Bolzer, 556 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1977) (same); United
States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977)
and 434 U.S. 1045 (1978); United States v. Crockett, 534 F.2d 589, 604 & n.17 (5th Cir.
1976) (same); United States v. Termini, 267 F.2d 18, 19-20 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 822 (1959); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2341(2), at 674.
The purpose of the confidential communications privilege is to encourage open and
frank marital communication and engender interspousal trust, thereby promoting marital
harmony. See United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1091 (1974); McCormick On Evidence, supra note 1, § 86, at 201; 8 J. Wigmore,
supra note 3, § 2341, at 673; Reutlinger, supra note 4, at 1358-59; Choice to Testify, supra
note 3, at 962-63 n. 10; Fourth Circuit, supra note 3, at 344; 11 Cum. L. Rev. 465, 472
(1980); 58 Den. L.J. 357, 359 (1981). The availability of the privilege "turns on circum-
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sons who engage in joint criminal activity do not have a harmonious
marriage and therefore the purpose of the privilege would not be served
by its application in such a case;36 marriages between partners who en-
gage in joint crimes do not deserve protection because of the diminished
rehabilitative potential of such marriages;3' and the exception is consis-
tent with the Supreme Court opinion in Trammel v. United States,38
which extensively criticized the privilege and sought to limit its scope.39
A. Value of the Marriage to the Spouses
It is argued that spouses who commit joint crimes do not enjoy marital
harmony and that application of the privilege in these cases does not
serve the privilege's underlying purpose.' Because there is no marital
harmony to preserve, employing the privilege merely excludes relevant
evidence.41
Concededly, a testimonial privilege, which by definition excludes rele-
vant evidence,42 should apply only when its application will further the
privilege's underlying purpose.43 The privilege against adverse spousal
stances surrounding the communication when it was made." United States v. Archer,
733 F.2d 354, 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 196 and 105 S. Ct. 198 (1984); see
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1951); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14
(1934); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, §§ 2335-2336, at 647-56; 2 C. Wright, supra note 1,
§ 406, at 438. An exception to the privilege for marital communications made in further-
ance of joint criminal activity is consonant with the purpose of the privilege, see United
States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 258 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 344 (1983); United
States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1380-81 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978);
United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 194 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986
(1973) (on marital privilege issue), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S 143 (1974), because
the joint commission of crime rather than marital harmony is promoted by protecting
such communications.
In contrast, the purpose of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony is to pre-
serve the marital harmony existing at the time a spouse is called to testify, by permitting
the witness-spouse to refuse to testify adversely. See supra notes 4, 6-7 and accompanying
text. An exception for marriages involving joint criminal activity will directly contravene
the purpose of the privilege because unwilling spouses will be forced to testify adversely,
thereby damaging or destroying the marital harmony that the privilege seeks to preserve.
See supra notes 4, 6-7, 9-10 and accompanying text.
36. See In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Trammel,
583 F.2d 1166, 1170-71 (10th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980);
Witness-Spouse, supra note 4, at 566.
37. See In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2267 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985); United
States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d
Cir. 1980); United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1091 (1974).
38. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
39. See United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1983).
40. See supra note 36.
41. See United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1170-71 (10th Cir. 1978), af'd on
other grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); Witness-Spouse, supra note 4, at 566.
42. See McCormick On Evidence, supra note 1, § 72, at 171; 8 J. Wigmore, supra
note 3, § 2175, at 3; Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship,
1984 Duke L.J. 631, 637.
43. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United
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testimony seeks to preserve marital harmony' and accordingly should
apply only when there is marital harmony to preserve.45 There is no
evidence, however, that married persons who participate in joint criminal
ventures do not enjoy marital harmony.46 Such an assumption, there-
fore, does not support the adoption of a general rule compelling joint
participant spouses to testify against one another.47
A case-by-case inquiry into the nature of the marriage is equally inap-
propriate. Because there are no objective standards by which a judge can
determine whether marital harmony exists,48 the decision would depend
solely on the particular judge's subjective view of what constitutes mari-
tal harmony.49 That this is not a proper area of judicial inquiry seems to
have been recognized by the Supreme Court in Trammel By vesting the
privilege in the witness 5°--the only person in the proper position to de-
termine whether there is marital harmony51-the Court obviated the
need for judicial inquiry into the nature of the marriage. 52 Because a
witness will willingly testify against his or her spouse when there is no
marital harmony,53 the privilege will not be extended to marriages that in
fact need no protection.54 Thus, there is no need for the joint partici-
States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note
3, § 2192, at 73.
44. See supra notes 4, 6.
45. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980); In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d
276, 277-78 (3d Cir. 1980); cf. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) (privilege
inapplicable after divorce); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 614 (1953) (privilege
inapplicable when spouses entered into marriage without any intention of living together
as husband and wife); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 221 (1839) (privilege
inapplicable when one spouse is charged with a crime against the other); United States v.
Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977) (privilege inapplicable when the marriage
has in fact, although not legally, terminated); United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568,
571 (10th Cir. 1975) (privilege inapplicable when marriage was entered into for sole pur-
pose of obtaining the benefits of the privilege).
46. In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980); see In re Koecher, No. 85-
1033, slip op. at 2267 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985); United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166,
1173 (10th Cir. 1978) (McKay, J., dissenting), affid on other grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980);
see also Choice to Testify, supra note 3, at 969 ("[p]artners in crime may indeed have a
very stable marital relationship"). It is noteworthy that in In re Koecher, the alleged joint
participant spouse claimed that she and her husband in fact enjoyed marital harmony, see
In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2259 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985), and that "she would
rather die in prison than give any testimony detrimental to her husband," id. at 2263.
47. See In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2267 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985); In re
Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980).
48. 69 Ill. B.J. 438, 441 (1981); see In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1980).
49. 69 Ill. B.J. 438, 441 (1981).
50. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980).
51. See Reutlinger, supra note 4, at 1384; Note, The Husband- Wife Testimonial Privi-
lege in the Federal Courts, 59 B.U.L. Rev. 894, 917-18 (1979); Choice to Testify, supra
note 3 at 971; Witness-Spouse, supra note 4 at 565; 58 Den. L.J. 357, 367 (1981).
52. See In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980); 58 Den. L.J. 357, 367
(1981); 69 Il. B.J. 438, 441 (1981).
53. See supra note 8.
54. See In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980); 58 Den. L.J. 357, 366-67
(1981); 69 11. B.J. 438, 440 (1981); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52-
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pants exception.
B. Value of the Marriage to Society
Proponents of the joint participants exception contend that a marriage
of partners who engage in crimes together is not worth preserving." It is
suggested that because of its diminished rehabilitative potential, such a
marriage has no value to society and therefore its preservation is not in
the public interest.56
Proponents of this argument ignore the fact that society has not sought
through substantive law, to penalize a marriage because the spouses
jointly participated in a crime.5 7 Neither penal nor domestic relations
law provides that a marriage must be dissolved because the couple com-
mitted a crime together.58 The absence of such legislation counsels
against adopting the exception which, in effect, imposes a supplementary
penalty for conspiracy when engaged in by spouses.5 9 In addition to im-
posing a sentence under the penal law, the government forces an unwill-
ing witness to testify against his or her spouse thereby damaging and
possibly destroying the marriage." In the absence of a substantive rule
of law attaching such a penalty to the commission of joint crimes by
spouses, it is inappropriate to produce this result through the use of an
evidentiary rule.61
Moreover, it does not necessarily follow from joint participation in a
crime that the marriage has no rehabilitative potential.62 The marriage
may help the couple to reintegrate with society, and it may restrain the
spouses from engaging in future criminal conduct.63 Although it is not
certain that the marriage will have these effects, the possibility should not
be disregarded.' A blanket rule is therefore unjustified. Furthermore, a
case-by-case determination of the rehabilitative potential of the marriage
seems impracticable in view of the fact that psychologists and sociolo-
gists who have studied criminal rehabilitation for years have not yet suc-
53 (1980) (Court's decision to vest privilege solely in witness-spouse motivated by desire
not to extend protection to marriages that in fact need none).
55. See supra note 37.
56. See United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Malfitano, 633
F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th
Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974). It should be noted that because the rehabilita-
tive potential of a marriage has not previously been considered a justification for the
privilege, see In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2267 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985), the
absence of such a potential is a dubious justification for an exception to the privilege. See
id.
57. In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See supra notes 7, 10, 46 and accompanying text.
61. In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980).
62. See In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2267 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985); In re
Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278-79 (3d Cir. 1980).
63. In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980).
64. See id. at 278-79.
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cessfully determined what rehabilitates criminals. 5 Accordingly, the
joint participants exception should not be recognized on the theory that
the marriage is not worth preserving. 6
C. The Implications of Trammel
It is argued that recognition of the joint participants exception is con-
sistent with the policy, adopted in Trammel, of narrowly construing the
privilege against adverse spousal testimony. 7 On the contrary, the
Supreme Court, in that case, implicitly rejected the exception.68 The wit-
ness and the defendant spouse were alleged to have been joint partici-
pants in a criminal conspiracy. 69 Because at that time the privilege could
have been claimed by either the witness or the defendant, the testimony
would have been excluded unless both spouses consented. 70 The witness
agreed to testify against her husband under a grant of use immunity7'
65. See, eg., H. Trester, Supervision of the Offender 188-89, 194-96 (1981) (arguing
that criminals are effectively rehabilitated by supervision in the forms of probation and
parole, rather than by imprisonment); Bergman, Some Criticism of Community Treat-
ment Projects and Other Alternatives Examined, in A World Without Prisons 215, 215-34
(C. Dodge ed. 1979) (arguing that community treatment programs are more successful in
rehabilitating criminals than is imprisonment); Dagger, Restitution, Punishment, and
Debts to Society, in Victims, Offenders, and Alternative Sanctions 3, 7-12 (1980) (arguing
that requiring a criminal to make restitution to the victim-either directly or through
community service-will effectively reform him); Martinson, What Works?-Questions
and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 Pub. Interest 22, 22-50 (1974) (concluding from a
study of the success of the various methods of rehabilitation that none of them effectively
rehabilitates criminals).
66. See In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2267 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985); In re
Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278-80 (3d Cir. 1980).
67. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
68. See Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 130; see also In re Koecher, No. 85-1033,
slip op. at 2266 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985) ("[IThe Supreme Court's action in Trammel has
some negative implications as regards the joint participant exception. If the Supreme
Court looked on the exception with favor. . . one would have expected the Court at
least to have indicated that the exception might still make the privilege unavailable even
when the witness-spouse asserted it."); Brief for Respondents at 8, 25-29, Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (prosecution argued that the privilege does not apply
when spouses are joint participants in crime); Brief for Petitioner at 9-17, Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (petitioner argued against adoption ofjoint participants
exception). In Trammel, the Court recognized that the Tenth Circuit's holding was
based on joint participation, see United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1169 (10th
Cir. 1978), aJf'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), yet the Court affirmed that deci-
sion on other grounds without any mention of joint participation. See Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 43, 53 (1980).
69. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 42.
70. See id. at 44.
71. Mrs. Trammel was granted immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1982).
See Trammel, 583 F.2d at 1168. Sections 6001-6005 provide that a witness in a federal
proceeding who claims the privilege against self-incrimination can be compelled to testify
notwithstanding the privilege. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1982). None of the informa-
tion derived from the compelled testimony, however, can be used against the witness in a
criminal proceeding other than a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or
otherwise failing to comply with the order issued pursuant to §§ 6001-6005. See id.
1030 [Vol. 53
AD VERSE SPOUSAL TESTIMONY
because she had been promised lenient treatment by the government.'
The defendant, however, claimed the privilege to exclude the adverse tes-
timony.73 The Tenth Circuit held that because there is no domestic har-
mony in a marriage involving joint criminal activity, the privilege was
unavailable to the witness and her spouse.7'
The Supreme Court declined to adopt the Tenth Circuit's proposed
exception to the privilege, deciding instead to modify the privilege by
vesting the right to claim it exclusively in the witness." The Court criti-
cized testimonial exclusionary rules in general76 and noted that they
must be strictly construed because of their adverse effect on truthfind-
ing.77 In addition, the Court discussed criticism of the privilege and con-
sidered suggestions that it be abolished altogether.78 Despite its obvious
desire to limit the privilege to the greatest extent possible, the Court did
not abolish the rule or adopt the proposed joint participants exception to
it,79 which would render the privilege meaningless.8" The Court rea-
soned that its modification of the privilege properly balanced the compet-
ing public interests in marital harmony and unobstructed factfinding.81
Apparently the Court was not convinced that the joint participants ex-
ception urged by the prosecution 2 would adequately protect the public
interest in the preservation of marital harmony. 3 The Court held that
"the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from tes-
tifying."8 4 The Court, by implication, rejected the contention that a joint
participant spouse can, consistently with the privilege, be compelled to
testify against his or her spouse.8" It is thus apparent that the Court still
72. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 42-43.
73. Id. at 42.
74. See Trammel, 583 F.2d at 1170-71.
75. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 43, 53.
76. See id. at 50.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 44-45.
79. See id. at 53.
80. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
81. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.
82. See Brief for Respondents at 8, 25-29, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40
(1980).
83. It should be noted that under the facts of Trammel, it would have been easier for
the Court to modify the privilege and adopt the proposed joint participants exception to it
by holding that: a witness can voluntarily testify against his or her spouse; Mrs. Tram-
mel's bargained-for testimony, see supra note 72 and accompanying text, was involun-
tary; and because she was a joint participant, Mrs. Trammel could be compelled to testify
against her spouse. Thus, the Court could have avoided criticism of its decision. See
Haney, supra note 3, at 274-75 (questioning voluntariness of adverse testimony given by
joint participant spouses); Modification, supra note 3 at 1021-22 & n.73 (same); Choice to
Testify, supra note 3, at 969 (same); Witness-Spouse, supra note 4, at 569 (same); 58 Den.
L.J. 357, 368 (1981) (same).
84. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.
85. See In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2266 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985); see also
In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., concurring) ("The
Supreme Court [in Trammel] chose.. . to continue to rely on [the] belief that compelled
testimony by one spouse against the other would have an adverse impact on their mar-
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considers the privilege necessary to protect the sanctity of a marriage.
III. EFFECTS OF ADOPTION OF THE EXCEPTION
Given that the privilege was retained by the Supreme Court in Tram-
mel, adoption of the joint participants exception is inappropriate because
the exception will, in effect, abolish the privilege. Adoption of the excep-
tion may result in abuse by prosecutors, who apparently need only allege
joint participation to force an unwilling witness to testify against his or
her spouse.8 6 Any fifth amendment claims that would be available as to
testimony that incriminates the witness as well as the spouse can be
barred by a grant of use immunity. 7 Because of the flexibility of the
substantive law of conspiracy" and the intimacy of marriages, it will be a
riage. . . . [A]n exception [to the privilege] for marriage relationships used to advance
criminal activities cannot be reconciled with that rationale.").
86. See In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980) (district court had
applied exception based on government affidavit stating that "[the prosecution had] 're-
ceived information from a cooperating witness indicating that [the witness-spouse was] a
co-conspirator by reason of her knowledge of the object of the conspiracy and her facilita-
tion of the attainment of the object of the conspiracy' "); United States v. Trammel, 583
F.2d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 1978) (McKay, J., dissenting) ("Under present practice in this
circuit, the mere allegation of conspiracy would permit the admission of the [spouse's]
testimony before the truth of the conspiracy allegation is established.") (emphasis in origi-
nal), affid on other grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); In re Koecher, No. Ml 1-188 (ELP)
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (exception was applied
based on the prosecution's offer of proof of the alleged joint participation), rev'd, No. 85-
1033, slip op. (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985); see also United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 300-
02 (7th Cir. 1983) (although testifying spouse had been convicted of the crime for which
his spouse was being tried, court did not rely on this fact to support its application of the
exception); United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1394, 1396-97 (7th Cir.) (opin-
ion silent with regard to a standard of proof of witness's joint participation; however,
defendant had been indicted for allegedly transporting witness, an alien, over state lines
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982)), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974).
87. See supra note 71.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) imposes criminal liability whenever "two or more persons
conspire either to commit any offense against the United States or to defraud the United
States. . .in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons [does] any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy." Id. Although in order to convict an individual
of conspiracy the prosecution must prove there was an agreement to carry out an unlaw-
ful purpose, see Nelson v. United States, 415 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1060 (1970); Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1968); Jones v.
United States, 251 F.2d 288, 293 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 919 (1958), the exist-
ence of the agreement may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, Iannelli v. United
States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975); United States v. Ryan, 478 F.2d 1008, 1015 (5th
Cir. 1973); see Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1947); United States v.
Perry, 550 F.2d 524, 528-29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 and 431 U.S. 918
(1977). As to the requirement that one of the agreeing persons must have commited an
act in furtherance of the conspiracy, proof of a noncriminal and relatively insignificant
act will suffice. See, eg., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 333-34 (1957) (attendance
at a lawful public meeting), overruled on other grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1
(1978); Castro v. United States, 296 F.2d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1961) (driving to gun
shop). The law has repeatedly been criticized as overbroad. See, e.g., Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446-50 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v.
Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408, 418 (2d Cir. 1960); Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspir-
acy, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1137, 1141-46 (1973); Marcus, Defending Conspiracy Cases: Mis-
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rare occasion when the government is unable to charge a potential wit-
ness with joint participation.89 Ironically, the more harmonious the mar-
riage, the easier it is for the government to make such charges.90 The
exception, in effect, threatens to obliterate the privilege retained by
Trammel.
Even assuming that the prosecutor is required to present substantial
proof of active criminal participation, the effect of adopting the exception
is unjustifiable.91 Under the exception, a witness who wishes to preserve
marital harmony by refusing to testify against his or her spouse is com-
pelled to testify and risk destroying that harmony.92 Not only is the goal
of the privilege-fostering marital harmony93 -directly contravened,
rendering the privilege meaningless, but in some cases the result may
even be dissolution of the marriage. It is inappropriate to produce such a
result through the use of an evidentiary rule.94
CONCLUSION
None of the arguments advanced to support the adoption of the joint
participants exception to the privilege against adverse spousal testimony
adequately justifies its adoption. Married persons who engage in joint
criminal activity may very well enjoy marital harmony; that harmony is
worth preserving because of the societal value it may have. Because the
Supreme Court implicitly rejected the exception in Trammel, arguments
that adoption of the exception is consistent with that opinion necessarily
fail. Finally, the effects of adoption of the exception counsel against it.
Adoption of the rule may well result in its abuse, and even when the rule
is not abused, its effect is not only to contravene the very purpose of the
sion Impossible?, 16 Trial, Oct. 1980, at 61, 64; Tarlow, Defense of a Federal Conspiracy
Prosecution, 4 Nat'l J. Crim. Def. 183, 184-85 (1978).
89. See In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Trammel,
583 F.2d 1166, 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 1978) (McKay, J., dissenting), aff'd on other
grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); Purdy, The Marital Privilege: A Prosecutor's Perspective, 18
Crim. L. Bull. 309, 322 (1982); see also Marital Privileges, supra note 8, at 196 ("little
more than the natural inferences which arise from the marital relationship-close associ-
ation with her husband and knowledge of his acts-may be sufficient to sustain a convic-
tion [of conspiracy]").
90. In re Koecher, No. 85-1033, slip op. at 2270 n.7 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1985) (quoting
In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1980)); In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276,279 (3d
Cir. 1980); see Marital Privileges, supra note 8, at 196.
91. If the exception is adopted, it should apply only when the witness has previously
been convicted (without compelled adverse spousal testimony) of the crime with which
his or her spouse is charged. Such a rule would at least eliminate the potential for
prosecutorial abuse discussed above, see supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
Although this was the factual situation in United States v. Clark, the court in that case
did not limit its holding to cases involving prior convictions. See 712 F.2d 299, 300.02
(7th Cir. 1983).
92. See supra notes 7, 9-10 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 4, 6 and accompanying text.
94. In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1980). See supra notes 57-61 and
accompanying text.
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privilege, rendering it meaningless, but also to impose a supplementary
penalty upon the spouses for the commission of the crime.
Amy G. Bermingham
